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Abstract 
This paper argues that both socio-economic disadvantage and political factors, such as the 
West’s foreign policy with regard to the Muslim world, along with historical grievances, play a 
part in the development of Islamic radicalized collective action in Western Europe. We 
emphasise the role of group identity based individual behaviour in organising collective action 
within radicalized Muslim groups. Inasmuch as culture plays any role at all in radicalization, it 
is because individuals feel an imperative to act on the basis of their Muslim identity, something 
to which different individuals will attach varying degrees of salience, depending on how they 
place their Muslim identity based actions in the scheme of their multiple identities. We also 
emphasize the role of the opportunistic politician, from the majority European community, in 
fomenting hatred for Muslims, which also produces a backlash from radicalized political Islam. 
We present comparative evidence on socio-economic, political and cultural disadvantage faced 
by Muslim minorities in five West European countries: Germany, the UK, France, Spain and 
the Netherlands. 
 
Keywords: Identity, Radicalization, Clash of civilizations, Terrorism. 
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1 Introduction 
 
During the past decade Western European countries have become increasingly fearful of 
the phenomenon of “home-grown terrorism” arising out of the radicalization of youthful 
first, second and even third generation Muslim immigrants. According to recent 
estimates, Muslims number 15-17 million in the EU-27 (Vaisse 2008). Radicalized 
individuals, born and bred in the West were involved in major terrorist attacks carried 
out in Europe since 9/11, such as the Madrid train bombings of March 2004, the 
London bombings of July 2005, as well as the 30 major failed plots discovered in the 
continent in the five years following 9/11 (Benjamin in Perry and Negrin 2008: 92). The 
media and the political debate point the finger of culpability to a particular religion-
Islam-as the source of this violent mobilisation. In addition to these acts of violence, 
Islamic “radicalization” also finds its expression in non-violent acts of defiance and 
statements of difference, such as the wearing of the hijab or head scarf and other distinct 
cultural practices. These symbolic actions produce discomfiture among the majority West 
European citizenry, as these are also seen as aggressive rejections of Western civilization.  
 
Additionally, these developments help explain the rise in popularity of theories of 
civilizational clashes between the West and Islam (Huntington, 1996; Lewis, 2003). 
Furthermore, a heated debate over the possibility of harmonious integration of Muslim 
communities has emerged. Countries with a traditional multi-cultural approach, such as 
the Netherlands, have experienced the emergence of a “Dutch-Muslim cultural war” 
(Scroggins 2005 in Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). In the UK, the activities of the 
Commission on Integration and Cohesion have marked a shift from multiculturalism and 
celebration of differences towards integration (Briggs and Birdwell 2009). Right-wing 
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parties capitalizing on anti-Muslim antipathy have gained popularity throughout Europe, 
and the Muslim population of the continent have become the principal source of public 
anxieties (Modood 2003). 
 
Although there is a vast body of work on how Islamic radicalization functions, and an 
even larger literature on the dangers it poses, the development of radicalization is often 
assumed to have emerged in a socio-economic and political vacuum. Implicit in these 
analyses is the attribution of violence to the innate nature of (a monolithic) Islamic 
mindset. The hatred for the West by some Muslim groups is treated as a given; hence 
conflict with the West necessarily follows. Some Western writers, such as Lewis (2003), 
also depict Muslims as wallowing in wounded pride about their historical decline, which 
fills some among them with a virulent hatred for the West. Huntington (1996) states that: 
“the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a 
different civilisation, whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and 
are obsessed with the inferiority of their power” (Huntington 1996: 217).   
 
The problem with these ‘culturalist’ views is that it treats global religons, such as Islam, as 
monolithic, whereas in reality there are many faces of Islam across both historical time 
and at the present. Secondly, and more importantly, individual identity is regarded as a 
singular phenomenon, ignoring the multiplicity of identities that individuals may possibly 
possess (Sen, 2008). Thus, it is conceivable for an individual to be simultaneously a 
Muslim, a European citizen, a believer in democracy, as well as someone who respects 
difference and human rights. Furthermore, culture is not immutable; rather it evolves 
over time, and changes as material conditions alter. For example, compared to a century 
ago, few today would regard Catholicism or Confucianism as intrinsically inimical to 
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capitalist development. It is important to note, however, that individual identification 
with group grievances is central to collective action surrounding Muslim radicalization.  
 
The alternative explanation for disgruntled Muslim behaviour in Europe lies in wider 
socio-economic disadvantage, the theoretical underpinnings for which date back to Ted 
Gurr’s (1970) classic work on relative deprivation as the source of rebellion. Stewart 
(2008) has documented the systematic disadvantage that Muslim groups face in 
European countries and worldwide (Muslims are a fifth or more of humanity). These 
range from economic discrimination in terms of jobs and lower incomes to under 
representation in public life. This phenomenon may be described as the horizontal 
inequalities that Muslims suffer from in contemporary Europe. Horizontal inequality is 
group-based inequality, rather than the inequality in an otherwise culturally or ethnically 
homogenous society; see Stewart (2000) on this. Muslim citizens in Europe are 
systematically poorer, suffer from greater unemployment and are less than 
proportionately represented in public life (Stewart, 2008), in addition to the opprobrium 
their cultural identity attracts. In short, Muslims in Western Europe may be subject to an 
inequality of opportunity on account of their identity; something that produces 
systematic disadvantage in the sense of Roemer (1998). 
 
This paper will argue that both socio-economic disadvantage and political factors, such 
as the West’s foreign policy with regard to the Muslim world, along with certain historical 
grievances play a part in the development of radicalization. Inasmuch as culture plays any 
role at all in radicalization, it is because individuals feel an imperative to act on the basis 
of their Muslim identity, something to which different individuals will attach varying 
degrees of salience, depending on how they place their Muslim identity based actions 
along the schema of their multiple identities. Muslim disadvantage is attributable both to 
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the socio-economic deprivation faced by Muslim migrants in Europe, and the plight of 
the global Ummah (Muslim world), where the perceived Western policies towards this 
predicament (in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and so on) are crucial. We also highlight the 
role of the opportunistic politician from the majority (white) community in fomenting 
hatred for Muslims, which also produces a backlash from radicalized political Islam. All 
over Western Europe there has been a growth in single issue, anti-immigrant, especially 
anti-Muslim immigrant parties in Denmark, the Netherlands and elsewhere. Racist 
messages that breed fear of minorities like Muslims can emanate from attention seeking 
politicians, who campaign on a single issue that scapegoat a particular group for all of 
society’s ills (crime, unemployment and so on). Some citizens among the non-Muslim 
majority are more susceptible to this message, particularly if they are less educated, more 
economically vulnerable and being disadvantaged themselves may have negative 
experiences of close interaction with Muslim migrants.    
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 contains a brief sketch of ideas 
underpinning fundamentalism and violence in Islam; section 3 presents a selected review 
of the literature concerned with the formation of individual identity, and the collective 
action that emanates from it, in accounting for home-grown radicalization in Europe; 
section 4 is concerned with political economy on how fear (of Muslims) and hatred (for 
the West by certain Muslim groups) may interact; section 5 focuses on five Western 
European countries (Germany, the UK, France, Spain and the Netherlands) and presents 
evidence on socio-economic, political and cultural disadvantage suffered by Muslim 
minorities; finally section 6 is by way of conclusion. 
 
2 The Anatomy of Muslim Radicalization     
 
6 
 
A monolithic religious identity may have been misleadingly overemphasized in 
attempting to explain radicalization. American scholars such as Samuel Huntington and 
Bernard Lewis have engaged in ‘culture talk’, postulating the incompatibility of Islam 
with Western values: “turn[ing] religion into a political category” (Mamdani 2004: 24).  A 
reference to Muslim people as a homogenous set of people, inherently prone to 
radicalization due to their religious beliefs, becomes the basis of cultural explanations for 
the rise of Islamic radicalization. As argued above, culture needs to be nuanced, the 
manner in which it evolves in response to material progress (or the lack of it) needs to be 
taken into account, as well as the fact that individual human beings have multiple cultural 
identities (Sen, 2008).  
 
Contemporary racism in Europe is driven more by disdain for cultural identities such as 
Islam, rather than biologically based phenomenon, such as complexion, as was the case 
until the recent past. This explains the rise in anti-Muslim sentiment, which is not merely 
an indignant reaction to violence perpetrated by Muslims, but is symptomatic of a wider 
disdain for Muslim culture. There are differences across various European nations. In 
some European nations it may be less politically incorrect to openly cast unqualified 
aspersions on Muslims and Islam.1 According to surveys2, negative perceptions about 
Muslims among non-Muslims have grown: in 2008 52% in Spain3, 50% in Germany, 
38% in France and 23% in the UK felt negative about Muslims, considering them a 
threat to Western civilization. The same survey indicates growth in the Muslim sense of 
identity amongst Muslims immigrants in Europe.  
                                                 
1 In the UK, for example, the anti-Muslim Dutch politician Geert Wilders was prevented from showing his 
anti-Islam film, Fitna, in the British House of Lords in February 2009 on the grounds that it might incite 
racial hatred; by contrast, his popularity is said to be on the rise in his native Netherlands.   
2 http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=262  
3 In Spain, for example, a liberal online newspaper recently accused Prime Minister Zapatero of being 
willing to turn Spaniards into Muslims for his alleged policy of appeasement towards Muslim communities 
in the country; see http://www.espana-liberal.com/20060929-zapatero-nos-volvera-musulmanes.html.  
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It is widely believed that Islam is an intolerant and violent religion, with its sacred texts 
replete with inflammatory statements about its foes. Increasingly, even in liberal circles, 
Islam is thought of, and depicted, as a religion that endorses violence against its 
‘enemies’. Unfortunately, these notions are based on selective and limited interpretation. 
It is, therefore, appropriate to cite some of its scripture that endorse tolerance, as these 
are less well known in liberal circles. Religious scripture is, by definition, open to myriad 
varieties of interpretation. Despite this, it can be argued that the Islam acknowledges and 
celebrates racial diversity,4 and requires believers to accept other religions as an article of 
faith.5 Some of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and his cousin and son-in-law Ali, 
during Islam’s first century (the 7th century AD) are testimony towards inclusiveness.6 
These statements illustrate how acts of gratuitous violence towards non-Muslims would 
be unjustifiable to believing Muslims in the absence of genuine grievances. The 
important point is that a devout Muslim must eschew racism in all forms, should not 
hate Judeo-Christian civilization and reject universal values of toleration; rather the 
dislike of the West emanates from injustices perpetrated thereof. Moreover, historically, 
Muslim countries and empires have exercised greater toleration towards other religions, 
                                                 
4 “---We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one 
another--the noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct”. Quran: 049.013. “And of His 
signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the difference of your languages and colours”. 
Quran: 030.022. English translations from Marmaduke Pickthall’s, The Glorious Quran,  
http://www.islam101.com/quran/QTP/index.htm 
5 “Say (O Muhammad): We believe in Allah and that which is revealed unto us and that which was revealed 
unto Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and that which was vouchsafed unto Moses 
and Jesus and the prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them, and unto Him 
we have surrendered”. Quran: 003.084 
6 Consider an excerpt from Muhammad’s Last Sermon (circa 632 AD): “An Arab has no superiority over a 
non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any superiority over an Arab; also a black person has no superiority over a 
white person, nor a white person has any superiority over a black person, except by piety and good action. 
Indeed the best among you is the one with the best character…...  
http://www.themodernreligion.com/prophet/prophet_lastsermon.htm 
Ali, the 4th Islamic Caliph, also the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad in a letter to Malik-e-Ashtar, his 
governor designate to Egypt (circa 656-661 AD): "Remember, Malik, that amongst your subjects there are 
two kinds of people: those who have the same religion as you have; they are brothers to you, and those 
who have religions other than that of yours, they are human beings like you.---- Let your mercy and 
compassion come to their rescue and help in the same way and to the same extent that you expect Allah to 
show mercy and forgiveness to you." (Nahjul Balagha) 
http://www.al-islam.org/nahjul/letters/letter53.htm#letter53. 
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compared to European practice until the 19th century (a good example would be Muslim 
ruled Medieval Spain).       
 
Historical acts that may add to the sense of Muslim collective grievances include events 
such as the wholesale expulsion of Muslims who did not convert to Christianity from 
Spain (in the 16th and 17th centuries) and Sicily (14th century). During the 20th century in 
the Middle East, the British-French Sykes-Picot pact (during the First World War) 
resulted in an extremely unfair disposition of the former Ottoman territories. Later, the 
emergence of what many regard as a colonial settler state, Israel, and the West’s lack of 
even handed behaviour towards the protagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict spawned 
deep resentment. Other areas of Muslim disadvantage in the recent past include Kashmir 
in India, and Bosnia in the European Balkans. Their predicament is often blamed on 
Western double standards towards the plight of Muslims. 
 
Terrorism is only part of the total set of actions adopted by radicalized Muslim groups in 
Europe, as many adopt strategies of peaceful protest, and some simply reject certain 
Western cultural practices. Terrorism was defined as “propaganda by the deed” (Mikhail 
Bakunin)7; a violent means of attracting attention to a political objective, which may or 
may not have a religious basis. The focus of the bulk of the recent literature on radical 
Islam in the West is on “home-grown terrorism”, which is conducted by individuals who 
“were born and/or spent most of their lives in the West; were radicalised within their 
Western home countries; have trained and achieved attack-capability in their Western 
home countries”8. Note that, suicide bombing or attacks is not exclusively a Muslim 
                                                 
7 In a letter to a Frenchman on the Present Crisis (1870), http://www.anarchyisorder.org/CD%234/TXT-
versions/Bakoenin,%20Michael%20-%20Letters%20to%20a%20frenchman.txt 
8 Sam Mullins, 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=12, accessed 
May 7th 2009.  
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phenomenon; data from the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism shows that the 
principal user and inventor of suicide attacks are the LTTE in Sri Lanka, a rather secular 
and definitely not Islamic group; see Pape (2006).  
 
Having noted that terrorism is not the only means of confronting the West, we could 
argue that the Muslim religious discourse that accompanies the retreat into 
confrontational behaviour towards the majority communities in their countries of birth 
can be linked to the spread of the Salafiyya movement (which means following those 
who went before, in this case early Muslims) among Muslim diasporas (ICG 2005). Such 
dynamics should be analysed against the backdrop of the current three-fold 
manifestation of Islamic activism: political, missionary and jihadi (ICG 2005).  
Reportedly, “political Islamists make an issue of Muslim misgovernment and social 
injustice and give priority to political reform to be achieved by political action; missionary 
Islamists make an issue of the corruption of Islamic values and the weakening of faith 
and give priority to a form of moral and spiritual rearmament that champions individual 
virtue as the condition of good government as well as collective salvation. Jihadi Islamists 
make an issue of the oppressive weight of non-Muslim political and military power in the 
Islamic world and give priority to armed resistance” (ICG 2005: ii). Political Islam, as 
embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood political parties and their affiliates in Muslim 
majority countries, does not put forward a violent strategy of action: it is usually 
organized in the forms of political parties and it seeks power through political rather than 
violent means. These parties rarely get anything approaching a majority of votes in 
democratic Muslim majority nations; see Islam (2005). Missionary activism tends to 
refrain from political confrontation; rather it tends to concentrate on preaching and 
reviving the community of believers (Ummah). It includes the Tablihgi (evangelical) and 
the Sufi (mystical) movements, which are theologically quite distinct from each other, but 
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avowedly peaceful. Jihadi Islamists are instead committed to violence with a view to 
defending (or expanding) Dar-al-Islam (the world of Islam). Originally comprised of the 
Jihadi Salafiyya, who had abandoned preaching activism and turned to radicalisation, as 
well as the Qutbists (inspired by the radical Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutub), it has 
gradually seen the merging of the two currents and their fusion with Bin Laden’s al-
Qaida network, with its chief ideologue Al-Zawahiri, who was the former leader of the 
Egyptian Qutbist movement. European Salafism itself has bifurcated into a reformist 
current and a Jihadi current; the latter has allegedly been infiltrated by Bin Laden’s Al-
Qaida network. There is a duality in European Salafism: on the one hand it provides a 
means for the personal search for religious truth; on the other hand it connects:  “all 
individuals of the Diaspora to a wider community – the Ummah or community of 
believers- as the primary locus of Muslim political obligation” (Escobar Jose, 2006).  
 
3 Identity and Collective Action 
 
With regard to identity based collective action, it is convenient to begin with the political 
economy of altruism.  This occurs when the donor derives utility or happiness from the 
utility of the recipient. Altruistic sensibilities also apply to those who espouse a cause, 
such as the well-being of the Muslim Ummah. Essentially, there are two forms of 
altruism. One is referred to as pure altruism. This is when the donor derives utility from 
the benefit of the recipient or the furtherance of a cause, but can obtain that utility 
passively because it does not necessarily require him to participate actively or directly. He 
is happy that a purpose is served, even when persons other than himself do the good 
deed. For example, individuals can be in favour of animal welfare, without actually 
paying into or participating in animal charities. They are happy that others do so. In this 
case, altruism is a public good, and as is well known there can be free riding on the public 
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good (this is when we let others pay for the common good). Another form of altruism is 
known as impact philanthropy, see Duncan (2003): this when the individual not only 
cares about someone else, but also feels compelled to actually participate in other 
people’s welfare or act in support of a just cause. This situation can lead to 
oversubscription, for example when the coffers of charities swelled with funds following 
the Tsunami of December 2004.    
 
Secondly, we have the innovative approach to the economics of identity, as proposed by 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Their approach provides another view on why identities can 
become salient, and how the collective action problem, as described by Olson (1965), is 
resolved. Individuals derive utility not just from consumption or identification with a 
cause, but also from their own behaviour that is in conformity to their sense of identity 
and the like minded behaviour of other members of the group they belong to; for 
example the performance of prayers by the individual and his co-religionists. Here the 
position that the group occupies in societal hierarchy is also crucial to their collective 
self-esteem. All of these factors (utility from identity based actions, similar actions by 
other group members, and the position of their group) enter an explicit utility function. 
The individual not only derives utility from a vector of his own actions, but also similar 
actions of other like-minded individuals belonging to his group, and above all his own 
identity or self image, which in turn depends on the group’s social standing. The last 
factor depends both on the group’s economic disadvantage, and other factors such as the 
West’s foreign policy towards the Muslim world. It can be argued, however, that low 
social standing may encourage individuals to abandon their primary identity in favour of 
other, less frowned upon, identities. These actions, however, would be insincere and 
based on strategic considerations. Also, following Akerlof and Kranton (2000), it is 
possible to show that many such individuals may be deterred from this course of action 
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by their peers. If another group member suffers disutility from other-identity based 
behaviour by another group member, they may lure the errant individual back to the 
fold, provided that the cost of doing so to themselves is not too large and is less than the 
loss inflicted on the deviant group member. This is more likely amongst poor but 
culturally homogenous communities suffering from widespread unemployment, and who 
live proximately to each other in isolated ghettos with close kinship ties (as in many 
metropolitan locations throughout Europe where Muslim families related to each other 
live cheek by jowl). Moreover, the dissident group may use this type of cooperative 
behaviour to solve the collective action problem, as described by Olson (1965). Thus, 
group grievances become individual grievances, and individuals act upon their group 
grievances. It is not their own poverty that will necessarily drive individual membership 
of a radical group, but the disadvantage faced by the group at large. But most 
importantly, if theory of politicized collective identity explains the behaviour of ordinary 
group members, the economics of identity sheds light on the kind of intra-group 
dynamics which lead to increasingly widespread radicalized collective action. 
 
Other disciplines in the social sciences (outside economics and political economy) have a 
longer history of emphasising the identification with a collective meaning of one-self. 
Mirroring Akerlof and Kranton’s importance of identity is the much earlier thought of 
Johan Galtung. He hypothesized that “aggression is most likely to arise in social 
positions of rank disequilibrium. In a system of individuals, it may take the form of a 
crime, in a system of groups the form of revolutions” (Galtung 1964:98). Simon and 
Klandermaans (2001) synthesized different branches of sociological and social 
psychological theory on inter-group confrontation and identified three subsequent steps 
for the formation of politicised collective identities: “a form of collective identity that 
underlies group members’ explicit motivations to engage in […] a power struggle” 
13 
 
(Simon and Klandermaans 2001: 323). Identity raises the awareness of shared grievances, 
the emergence of adversarial attributions to blame opponents and the involvement of 
society by triangulation. The concept of collective identity helps explain the increased 
tendency towards Islamic radicalization in Western European countries, and particularly 
among the youths born and raised in such countries. Religion, being “among the most 
important markers of group identity” (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007: 1449), might become a 
strategic tool for uncertainty reduction, as well as self-enhancement. Particularly in 
countries where policies towards migrants put an emphasis on assimilation, those 
belonging to ethnic minorities may turn to their in-groups as a source of identification, 
and as a means of reducing uncertainty (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). Further, ethnic 
groups who are discriminated against may resort to group-based strategies involving 
“increased in-group identification and a distancing from the majority group” (Verkuyten, Yildiz 2007: 
1449) for their own self-enhancement.    
 
What is the role of economic deprivation in the process of collective identity positioning? 
There are three related concepts that can be applied here: relative deprivation, 
polarization and horizontal inequality; see Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2009) on this. The 
notion of relative deprivation dates back to the work of Ted Gurr (1970) who defines it 
as the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what they actually think 
they can get, or in short the disparity between aspirations and achievements. Polarisation 
is defined to occur when two groups exhibit great inter-group heterogeneity combined 
with intra-group homogeneity. The notion of horizontal or inequalities between groups, 
classified by ethnicity, religion, linguistic differences and so on is thought to be an 
important cause of contemporary civil war and sectarian strife. The expression 
‘horizontal inequality’ originates in the work of Frances Stewart; see Stewart (2000), and 
should be distinguished from vertical inequality, which is the inequality within an 
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otherwise homogenous population. Stewart (2008) demonstrates Muslim horizontal 
inequalities in Europe, which serves to fuel the fire of radicalization. 
 
That said, from the viewpoint of the individual perpetrator of radicalized Islamic 
activities, intrinsic motivation, which is often the outcome of their collective sense of 
humiliation, plays a major role; therefore deterrence against these groups may backfire if 
it hardens their resolve to resist, as is modelled by Addison and Murshed (2005). Also, 
perpetrators of extreme acts of violence are not always uneducated and poor, as is the 
case in the Middle East (Krueger and Maleckova, 2002), or even with the London 
bombers or the murderer of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands. In fact, education can 
act as an indicator of reliability. Individual utility functions associated with terrorism or 
radical acts are altruistic and based on the social positioning of the group and not the 
individual; these individuals are motivated by the plight of their impoverished and 
oppressed brethren. There is not only identification with a cause, something that can also 
be present in passively interested individuals, but an imperative to participate in furthering 
that cause. Participatory altruism or identity based behaviour leads to a stronger urge to 
act compared to ordinary altruism, where the individual can passively derive utility from 
the furtherance of the cause he espouses. This drive to take direct action may result in 
violence, including self-destruction. From the viewpoint of individual choice, extreme 
acts like suicide bombing may be rational, as explained by Wintrobe (2002). This is 
because the individual has made an all or nothing choice between solidarity with a cause 
and individual autonomy. In this situation, increasing deterrence has little impact on 
individual choice, which is another way of saying that deterring radicalization will not 
succeed in preventing people from committing themselves to their cause, even if the 
success rate of individual acts of radicalization diminishes.  
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4 The Interaction between Fear and Hatred 
 
Just as aggrieved Muslims, indoctrinated and herded by conflict entrepreneurs into 
groups for collective action, may feel a profound hatred for the West, certain politicians 
and political parties in the West seek their own political self-advancement by preaching 
the dangers posed by Islam in general, and Muslim migrants in particular. In 2001, for 
instance, the Danish People’s Party campaigned with a poster showing a young blond girl 
and the statement “When she retires, we will be a Muslim majority nation”: the party 
later came in third in terms of seats in Parliament, experiencing a 70% increase in its vote 
bank. In the 2002 French Presidential elections, Jean-Marie Le Pen of the Front National 
– later convicted for spreading Islamophobic messages in an interview to the Newspaper 
Le Monde in 2003- won a place in the runoff against Chirac and received 17% of votes. 
In August 2007, the Governor of Carinthia in Austria, Joerg Haider promised to ban the 
construction of mosques and minarets in his Province; the Austrian right won 28% of 
votes in the September 2008 general elections. This is the notion of fear of a minority, 
which in part is whipped up by exaggerated statements from hate-mongering politicians 
(Glaeser, 2005) and the political “exploitation” of it. The appeal of anti-Muslim political 
parties, such as the British National Party or the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn, has pushed 
governing parties to adopt non-accommodating policies towards immigrants, albeit 
moderate versions of those proposed by right-wing extremists, in an effort to maximise 
their constituencies (Fetser and Soper, 2003).     
 
Following Glaeser (2005) we can think of the hate message against Muslim migrants as 
originating in a signal sent out by a politician, whose word (credibility) is not exactly the 
‘coin of the realm’, because he may be deliberately sending out a false hate message as a 
cheap way of advancing his own popularity. Its attractiveness to the public will depend 
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on their need for scapegoats and their own personal life experiences of these minority 
groups. Not all these signals will be believed: for example, some hate mongering 
politicians may be mistrusted, the better educated among the public may discount part of 
the message and others with greater knowledge of the minorities based upon personal 
interaction may similarly disregard this signal.9 There is a cost to members of the public 
of verifying the veracity of the signal through a search process. Among the majority 
group there will be two different types of citizens. One group, the high cost type of 
individual, suffers both a greater perceived loss from Muslim dissidents and has a higher 
cost of verification of the signal. This is all the more so, if the search costs of verifying 
the signal entail an earlier lumpy fixed cost in education, say. These individuals are more 
likely to abandon the search for truth in favour of the hate message. Not only that, but 
they will clamour for public action against the object of their phobia. Also, after major 
riots involving (male) Muslim youths and terrorist attacks like the London bombings, all 
individuals from the majority community may believe the hate message for a time, 
effectively tarring all Muslims with the same (terrorist) brush. If enough voters believe 
the signal then public action will be called for, and Islamophobia or fear of Muslims 
acquires the nature of a public good. Note that because of the non-rivalled and non-
excludable nature of a public good, even those who do not derive utility from these 
actions are ‘forced’ to ‘consume’ the good and finance it via taxation.  The state will be 
compelled to act at the taxpayers expense. These take the form of anti-Muslim and anti-
immigrant legislation making it difficult for families to join relatives in Europe, 
integrationist nationalisation policies such as linguistic and cultural proficiency tests, the 
banning of head-scarves and veils (niqab or burqa). These policies are more likely to bear 
fruition in European nations where proportional representation is the rule, and coalition 
                                                 
9 The PEW world surveys indicate that dislike of Muslims in Europe is greater among the older and 
less educated segments of the population; http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=262. 
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governments the norm, as minor anti-Muslim parties can influence public policy, unlike 
in the UK, where despite some anti-Muslim rhetoric, the Islamophobic agenda is 
prevented from surfacing by the leadership of the leading parties in a winner take all (first 
past the post) electoral system that does not favour a minority-single issue political 
platform, even if anti-terrorist laws and measures have become more rigorous.   
 
The model in Murshed (2008) interacts the fear (a public good) outlined above with 
hatred for the West amongst some radical Muslim groups in the West (a club good in the 
sense that only voluntary membership and contribution allows individuals to participate 
in the collective action). The results are unsurprising, both a rise in Muslim economic and 
political deprivation as well as anti-Muslim policies at home and abroad raise 
confrontation between radical Muslim groups and the state. The important point, once 
again, is that radicalization does not develop in a vacuum: it is fuelled by Western fear 
(and the intrinsic dislike) of Islam and Muslims. This fear is not just confined to potential 
violence emanating from Muslim Jihadi extremists, it also includes a general dislike for 
non-violent Muslim conventions and civilization.   
 
5 Evidence from Western European countries 
 
We now present evidence regarding socio-economic, political and cultural collective 
disadvantage suffered by Muslims in five European countries where Islamic 
radicalization has fuelled significant political debate.  
 
FRANCE 
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France is currently the European country with the largest Muslim community. Estimates 
point to a Muslim population of around 6 million people, i.e. 10% of the population 
(Franz 2007). Two million of them are French citizens10.  The discovery that the French 
national Zacarias Moussaoui was involved in the planning of 9/11, and the bouts of 
urban rioting in the autumn of 2005, when mostly youth of North-African origin set the 
French banlieues on fire11, has paralleled the increase in support expressed for the right-
wing and anti-immigrants party Front National, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, who obtained 
11% of the votes in the 2007 presidential election12.  
 
A number of second- and third generation migrants, who were born and brought up in 
the country, have self-reportedly developed resentment towards mainstream French 
society. The perception of constituting a second class citizenry and discrimination 
experienced from “housing to entry into nightclubs” (Franz 2007: 102) has led “many in 
this group [not to] think it possible to consider oneself both Muslim and French” (Franz 
2007:100). A greater interest in religion within Muslims has emerged. A study conducted 
among suspected members of Al-Qaida in French prisons found that while they generally 
did not come from devout families, they later turned to Islam as a source of self-
identification and self-respect, previously denied them by French society: “to become 
someone who is feared, if not respected, one has to be openly Muslim. Islam liberates. In this sense, I feel 
very Muslim” (Rosenthal in Perry and Negrin EDS 2008: 188).  Moreover, a 2001 poll 
published by the French newspaper Le Monde found for example that Muslims were 
attending mosque and praying more frequently than they had been in 1994, when a 
similar survey was conducted13. 
                                                 
10 http://www.meforum.org/337/islam-in-france-the-french-way-of-life-is-in, accessed May 8th 2009.  
11http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/minette_marrin/article589708.ece, accessed 
May 8th 2009.  
12 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6582479.stm, accessed May 10th 2009. 
13 http://pewforum.org/publications/reports/muslims-europe-2005.pdf, accessed May 10th 2009.  
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French Muslims suffer from socio-economic, political and cultural group inequalities. 
The percentage of Muslims who do not finish secondary school appears considerably 
higher than that of non-Muslims (Stewart 2008).  The Paris-based Montaigne Institute 
has found that the unemployment rate for North Africans at 30% is considerably in 
excess of the national average.14 The chances of finding employment in the service sector 
are rather thin: discrimination is particularly widespread in the retail and hospitality 
industries, which involve contact with people (Franz 2007: 102).  It is estimated that 60% 
of inmates in French prisons are Muslim (Vidino in Perry and Negrin EDS 2008). 
Residential discrimination is also high, with most of the Muslim population concentrated 
in low-income housing around the major cities, the banlieus. Such areas host the “long-
term jobless men and women of Arab descent and more recent immigrants” (Franz 
2007:  102). The government’s definition of districts such as Paris’s Clichy sous-Bois as 
“sensitive urban areas” has aroused much political debate. 
 
 
GERMANY 
 
Germany has a Muslim community amounting to around 3.2-3.4 million, which 
corresponds to 4% of a total population of 82.4 million (ICG 2007). The country hosts 
the biggest Turkish diaspora community in Europe. Evidence has been collected that 
“the attacks of 9/11 were partially planned in Hamburg, Germany, where three of the 
four pilots of the hijacked planes had lived and met, and from where they received 
extensive financial and logistical support until the day of the attack” (Vidino in Perry and 
Negrin EDS 2008: 158). In 2006 a plot to blow up trains in Dortmund and Koblenz 
                                                 
14 http://pewforum.org/publications/reports/muslims-europe-2005.pdf, accessed May 10th 2009.  
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failed; in September 2007, German authorities charged a native German and youthful 
convert to Islam with heading a terrorist cell planning attacks against American targets in 
Germany. Moreover, the country has experienced an augmented interest in Islam within 
the Turkish community. This has manifested itself in the increase of the number of 
female students attending school wearing the hijab, and the reversion to traditional 
practices among the Turkish middle classes that has stirred the businesses related to 
traditional weddings and circumcisions in Berlin’s districts of Kreuzberg and Neukolln 
(Franz 2007). 
 
A number of right-wing politicians with an assimilative view on Muslim immigration 
demanded language courses and loyalty tests for the naturalization of Muslims “as proof 
of Germanness and democratic credentials” (ICG 2007: 3) have found support in the 
German population, 58% of whom expect “a coming conflict with the Muslim 
population” (a two-fold increase since 2004), 46% fear an imminent terrorist attack, and 
42% believe terrorists may be hidden among the Muslim population (ICG 2007: 22). 
 
Horizontal inequalities are suffered by Muslims in the socio-economic as well as in the 
political realm. Prospects of higher educational access, which assists upward social 
mobility are particularly bleak for Turks. Educational success at the secondary level in 
Germany was more highly correlated with parental socio-economic status and 
educational success than in any other OECD country (ICG: 22). Turkish students in 
German universities are outnumbered by the Chinese15. Turkish immigrants are less likely 
to pursue apprenticeships that lead to jobs, and their rates of unemployment are high.  
 
                                                 
15 There are 25,000 Turkish University students, compared to a population of 235,989 Turkish 18 to 25 
year olds. Chinese university students number 27,000, ICG: 2007. 
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Although the German housing system is not comparable to the French in terms of 
ghettoization (housing companies must adopt distributional criteria when allocating 
dwellings to immigrants and ethnic minorities, and a threshold of no more than 20% of 
foreigners for each apartment complex was established by some companies), around 
50% of Turks still report discrimination when looking for accommodation. (EUMC 
2006).  
 
After the new citizenship law was introduced in 2000, most parties are seeking to secure 
immigrant members (ICG report: 30). However, the legacy of the “imperial and state 
citizenship law”, in force from 1913 to 1999, which deprived the migrant “guest 
workers” of political rights, though granting them access to welfare, has denied first and 
second-generation immigrants access to genuine political representation. Islamic activism 
has also been curtailed by the activities of the Verfassungsschutz, the provincial and 
national offices mandated to protect the constitution, “which monitor potentially anti-
democratic or un-constitutional activities of both registered and underground civil 
society groups” (ICG report 2007: 3). Being labelled Islamist by these authorities can lead 
to the refusal of citizenship, access to public housing and even residence permits.  
 
UNITED KINGDOM  
 
The United Kingdom has a Muslim population of around 1.6 million, accounting for 
2.8% of the national population, 46% of whom are British born, with a third aged below 
1516.  Serious anti-Muslim political rhetoric did not materialise in the UK after the 
London bombings of 2005 as: (a) Premier Tony Blair and other political figures diffused 
any anti-Muslim backlashes unlike  many of their counterparts in Europe following 
                                                 
16 http://pewforum.org/publications/reports/muslims-europe-2005.pdf, accessed May 8th 2009.  
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atrocities or plots in their countries, (b) Muslim leaders immediately condemned the 
attacks, and (c)in 2007 the Research Information and Communications Unit, operating 
within the newly formed Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, advised Ministers to 
stop using the phrase “war on terror” and cease talking about the “Muslim problem” 
(Briggs and Birdwell 2009). Despite this, moves were made away from a traditionally 
multicultural approach to immigration to an assimilative policy, marked by the 
establishment of a Commission on Integration and Cohesion (Briggs and Birdwell 2009). 
In the wake of 9/11, civics classics and a loyalty oath were added as requirements for 
citizenship. More recently, a coalition of both left and right has reportedly emerged 
which criticizes the UK government for what they call a policy of appeasement towards 
Islamic groups, such as the FOSIS (Federation of Student Islamic Societies) and the 
Leicester’s Islamic Foundation (Briggs and Birdwell 2009). 
 
British society is reportedly experiencing an identity crisis: a public-opinion poll taken 
shortly after September 11 found that 26% of the population felt that Islam was a threat 
to Western values (Travis in Fetser and Soper 2003). The 2009 Gallup Report on 
Coexistence (2009) shows that 26% of the British public think that people with different 
religious practices threaten their way of life. These figures are lower than in comparable 
Western European countries with substantial Muslim populations. Islam has indeed 
become a visible religion in the country: 80% of British Muslims state they attend the 
mosque regularly, and results of a survey conducted in London show that “there are now 
more people attending mosque regularly than going to church”.17  Despite some evidence 
that British Muslims are generally better off than Muslims in other European Countries 
(Fetser and Soper in Pew 2006), there is evidence that they suffer from socio-economic, 
political and cultural group inequalities.  
                                                 
17 http://pewforum.org/publications/reports/muslims-europe-2005.pdf, page 6.  
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School attainment and achievements are systematically lower within the Muslim minority. 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi rates of attainment in language and literacy at an early age were 
57% of those of whites (Stewart 2008); 36% of British Muslims drop out of school with 
no qualifications; a fifth of 16 to 24 year old Muslims in Britain are unemployed (Franz 
2007). Almost one-third of Muslims of working age have no qualifications, the highest 
proportion for any faith group (Bunglawala in Briggs and Birdwell 2009). Inequalities are 
also present in the access to jobs, and in employment conditions. In 2004 a British 
government report indicated that the unemployment rate among Muslim cohorts in the 
UK was three times that of the general population (Franz 2007); 14% of Muslims over 
25 are unemployed, compared with a national unemployment rate of 4%. Residential 
segregation is also encountered: the London Pakistani community, comprised of around 
140.000 people, is concentrated in four of London’s districts. One of them, Newham, is 
the fourth worst place to live in the UK.18  
 
Muslims are also under-represented in the political sphere: in 2005, less than 2.3% of 
members of parliament were from ethnic minority groups, which represent 10% of the 
population (Stewart 2008). The British police have, however, set a target of 25% ethnic 
minority staff by 200919.  
 
SPAIN 
 
According to the U.S. Department of State International Religious Freedom Report of 2008, 
there are 1.15 million Muslims in Spain, two thirds of them being immigrants without 
                                                 
18 http://www.channel4.com/4homes/on-tv/best-and-worst/best-and-worst-places-to-live-2006-08-06-
18_p_1.html 
 
19 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4032987.stm 
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Spanish nationality and the rest being converted Spaniards20. The presence of Islam in 
the country has reportedly grown exponentially since the 1970s, as the result of both the 
number of migrants from neighbouring Islamic counties, particularly Morocco, and the 
tendency among Spaniards to convert (Mehrotra 2005).   
 
The train bombings in Madrid in 2004 reinforced the unrest with the Muslim minority 
that the Spanish general public had felt since the events of 9/11: 82% of those in the 
general public who see Islamic identity on the rise, call it a bad thing.21 Data collected by 
the Spanish Guardia Civil document that between January 2004 and March 2005 there 
were 30 reported anti-Muslims attacks in the country.22 In 2006 the newspaper El Pais 
reported that after March 11, the number of attacks conducted by right-wing youth 
groups against Mosques, and threatening letters sent to Imams had increased.23  
 
Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero has adopted a tone and language respectful to Islam. 
After the Madrid attacks on March 22nd 2004, he declared in a meeting with the 
representatives of the Arab League that the Spanish Muslims have demonstrated the 
incompatibility between Islam and Terrorism,24 and defined Islam as a pacific and 
tolerant source of identity. After a decade-long debate, in January 2005 the Spanish 
government permitted the teaching of Islamic subjects at public schools in major cities of 
Spain with a significant Muslim presence (Mehrotra 2005). However, despite some 
political commitment, the record of horizontal inequalities suffered by Muslims in Spain 
leaves much to be desired.  
 
                                                 
20 See http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108473.htm, accessed May 20th 2009.  
21 Pew 2006, The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims view each other, 
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=830, accessed May 10th 2009.    
22 http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2007/02/14/espana/1171468241.html, accessed May 10th 2009.  
23 http://www.webislam.com/?idn=5476, accessed May 8th 2009.  
24 http://www.webislam.com/pdf/pdf.asp?idn=549, accessed May 10th 2009. 
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Although permitted by law, the building of mosques is frequently met with opposition 
from Spanish society. Spanish converts are still the only credited advocates for Muslim 
rights in the country (Mehrotra 2005).   
 
A number of studies have documented the perception of discrimination: a field study in 
2000 found that many Muslims in Spain complained of overt discrimination against their 
children by non-Muslim fellow pupils, who constantly stigmatised them as Moors. 
Another study conducted by Gema Martin-Munoz found that many Moroccan 
immigrants, despite being well-educated, still met with difficulties when looking for 
qualified jobs, as “many Spaniards did not want to be seen on the same footing as a 
Moor” (Mehrotra, 2005: 87).  
 
Residential segregation results in the concentration of the Muslim population in the 
suburbs of Madrid, Barcelona and other Andalusian cities, which are characterised by a 
depressed socio-economic status. Since 2003 there have been nearly 6000 Moroccans and 
Algerians in Spanish jails, mostly serving sentences for petty crimes.  
 
NETHERLANDS 
 
According to the last official data released by the Central Bureau of Statistics, on January 
1st 2004, the Muslim population in the Netherlands comprised about 1 million, 
accounting for 5.8% of the total population. Two thirds of them were originally from 
Turkey and Morocco, and 40% of them were second generation migrants. Despite being 
a country with traditionally a multicultural approach towards migrants: “Dutch society 
and the majority group have become rejecting and assimilative in their orientation toward 
ethnic and cultural diversity” (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007:1446). The assassination in 
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2002 of Pim Fortuyn, a Dutch politician who had famously declared Islam a backward 
culture, as well as the murder in 2004 of Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh by 
Mohammed Bouyeri, a young Dutch-Moroccan, heightened the simmering tension 
between the Dutch autochthon (native-white) population and the Muslim minority. In 
2002, following the assassination of Pim Fortuyn his new and avowedly anti-Muslim 
party won 18% of the votes in the Dutch general elections25, securing 26 seats in the 
Parliament (Irwin and Van Holsteyn 2004). The murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 was 
followed by unprecedented vitriolic (even crusade-like) anti-Islamic acts and statements 
that were not countered by the governing elite. After the assassination, the Dutch 
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia recorded a total of 106 violent incidents 
against Muslim targets in just one month. In December 2004 a Muslim primary school in 
Uden was destroyed in an arson attack. 80% of the Dutch population was found to be in 
favour of “stricter measures to force integration”26, after commentators and officials had made 
it clear that Muslims should accept Holland’s liberal views- “either voluntarily of by 
government coercion”27.  As indicated, these developments were in sharp contrast to the 
reaction of the British leadership to the London bombings of 2005. The loyalty of 
Muslim Dutch politicians born in Muslim countries (Ahmed Abu Talib, Mayor of 
Rotterdam, for example) has been called into question. Survey results released in April 
2009 show that 40% of the Dutch population agree with the anti-Muslim sentiments of 
right-wing politician Geert Wilders, although only 18% would vote for him.28  
 
Muslims in the Netherlands suffer from different dimensions of horizontal inequality. As 
far as access to the labour market is concerned, it has been noted that more than half of 
                                                 
25 http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=2642_0_4_0, accessed May 22nd 2009.  
26 http://pewforum.org/publications/reports/muslims-europe-2005.pdf, accessed May 8th 2009.  
27 http://pewforum.org/publications/reports/muslims-europe-2005.pdf, accessed May 8th 2009. 
28 http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2009/04/wilders_ideas_enjoy_40_support.php, accessed 
May 11th 2009.  
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the Turks and more than 60% of Moroccans have an unskilled job, compared with less 
than 30% for the native Dutch (Stewart, 2008). An experiment was carried out in 
September 2005 where 150 CVs appropriately geared to job vacancies were sent to 
numerous companies in the Netherlands. Half carried a traditional Dutch name and the 
other half a foreign/Islamic-sounding name. Of the 75 “Dutch” CVs, 69 persons were 
invited for interview, and of the 75 “foreign” CVs only 33 persons were invited” (EUMC 
2006).   
 
With regard to education, 40% of Turks and 45% of Moroccans have had no more than 
primary education (Stewart 2008). Among second and third generation Muslim migrants 
drop-out rates from school are higher (Stewart, 2008); further, in mixed schools, the 
performances Muslim children also tend to be far below the level of Dutch-natives 
(Driessen and Merry, 2006).  
 
Residential segregation is also widespread, when it comes to Muslim communities. To an 
extent, this may be an issue of concern for most ethnic minorities, who tend to 
concentrate in low cost housing areas, where criminality, poverty and pollution are 
significant  (EUMC 2006). However, a recent survey shows that in the Netherlands 
12.2% of respondents do not want to have Muslims as neighbours, as compared to only 
5.17% who do not want migrants as neighbours (Strabag and Listhaug 2008: 278). This 
also shows that Muslims are the most poorly regarded of all minorities.   
 
In a survey of 104 Turkish-Dutch participants in the Utrecht area, Verkuyten and Yildiz 
(2007) found that more than 50% indicated a low or neutral Dutch identification and  
63.3% indicated neutral or high dis-identification (i.e. a reaction “against things Dutch and 
develop[ment of] a so-called reactive or oppositional identity” (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007: 1450).   
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6 Conclusions 
 
Muslim terrorism and radicalization has been viewed either as a type of criminal deviant 
behaviour arising from low individual opportunity costs of abandoning the productive 
labour market, or alternatively ascribed to the civilizational clash that Muslims will 
inevitably initiate. Group identity and low self-esteem has, in this approach, been 
relatively neglected, and where present, the possible multiplicity of individual identity 
(Muslim and other) has been ignored.  
 
The country-based evidence in this paper shows that the radicalization does not occur in 
a social, political and economic vacuum; nor does it lend support to the ‘culture talk’ 
hypothesis, which singles out radicalization – and terrorism- as an intrinsic characteristic 
of Islamic practice.  We have argued that politicised collective identity can account for 
the conflictual interaction between “fear” and “hatred” which largely underpins the 
emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Western Europe. “Fear” is the anxiety felt by 
the majority; it is both the cause and the effect of fear-creating messages publicised by 
attention-seeking politicians. In this respect, there are differences across countries, 
British politicians have commendably counteracted feelings of fear following atrocities 
perpetrated by Muslims; the same is true for the governing Spanish leadership, although 
it met with less success. In the rest of Western Europe the conventional political elite has 
been less than robust in coming forward to allay excessive fearfulness of Islam.  By 
“hatred”, we refer to a set of behaviour and actions adopted by Muslim migrants, ranging 
from non-violent acts such as the wearing of hijabs to outright terrorism, all of which are 
part of a common attempt to signal difference and defiance to the majority community. 
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Horizontal inequalities suffered by Muslims, both worldwide and within Europe, are 
central to the formation of collective grievances. Perceptions regarding European foreign 
policies towards the Muslim world, which are ridden with double standards, are equally 
to blame. Majority versus minority inter-group conflict in Western European countries 
may also be regarded as a form of “positional” conflict, with two groups competing for 
material as well as symbolic resources. In this connection, a great deal of ink has been 
wasted in pointing out the relatively better social background of the perpetrators of 
violence, compared to the average position of the Muslim communities whose cause they 
espouse. The economics of identity and altruism, which we have sketched above, 
indicates that it is not an individual’s poor personal circumstance that provides the spur 
towards direct action; rather it is the condition of the group. Akerlof and Kranton’s 
(2000) approach provides further insights into intra-group dynamics, whereby leaders 
bent on confrontation have ways of preventing members from straying, something that 
is easier to monitor in poor and deprived communities.  
 
Evidence from the country-based profiles further shows that discrimination against 
Muslims is rife, leading to conditions that are ripe for political mobilisation. Islamic 
leaders bent on confrontation are more able to produce adversarial attributions according 
to which “a specific out-group, an authority, or “the system”, must be blamed for the 
group’s predicament” (Simon and Klandermaans 2001: 325). In turn, this allows further 
politicisation, as group members can then identify an external opponent group as “them” 
for what they are doing to “us” (Simon and Klandermaans 2001). Finally, society is called 
upon to take sides either with one-group or with its opponent: in such context, right-
wing politicians are able to harness their constituencies’ fear of Muslims to increase their 
support. Our case studies illustrate that fear-mongering is greater in some European 
countries, and the UK is the most at variance with continental Europe in being less 
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Islamophobic. Interestingly, terrorism in this context may become a vehicle in the power 
struggle to win the heart and minds of the general public; allegedly, terrorists “have even 
tried to provoke authorities (the police or the government) to engage in oppressive 
action or legislation, hoping that such oppression will generate anger and solidarity on 
the part of potential allies or the general public” (Simon and Klandermaans 2001: 329).  
 
Against the backdrop of a politicised Muslim identity, and substantial horizontal 
inequalities suffered by Muslims, domestic ‘integrationist’ policies aimed at ‘moderate 
Muslims’ are unlikely curb radicalization- let alone fight terrorism. Rather, they may 
backfire. American style integrationist policies are gaining favour in Europe, but these are 
doomed to failure unless the objects of the integrationist policies are also offered equality 
of opportunity, which means redressing Muslim horizontal inequalities. Furthermore, 
and quite crucially, if individuals have multiple identities as we suggest, then they are 
more likely to act on the basis of their other (European and non-Muslim) identities when 
they are less socio-economically deprived and less frowned upon. Radicalization is also 
unlikely to diminish unless the existing horizontal inequalities are narrowed, and the 
cultural opprobrium towards Islam that stems from and reinforces disadvantage, 
continues to be fomented by attention-seeking politicians.  The presence of virulent 
Islamophobic messages (more common in some European countries) not only instils 
fear, but also elicits hatred, and can undo the pacific-integrationist effects of material 
progress amongst Muslims residing in Europe.  
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